El Congreso abre la puerta a que las centrales nucleares operen más de 40 años

Hay noticias que me sorprenden y me dejan perplejo, la enmienda del senado a la ley de economía “sostenible” que permite alargar el periodo de vida de las centrales nucleares  que se encuentran en España a más de 40 años es una de ellas. Por un lado nos encontramos con una de las columnas de pensamiento de los movimientos de izquierdas europeos, nucleares no gracias, esta columna que si algún día estoy de humor analizaré, se basa en la larga vida de los residuos, lo peligrosas que son, lo innecesarias que son al disponer de otros métodos para producir energía y toda la retahíla. Hace muchos años que no se construye ninguna central nuclear en España debido principalmente a la opinión publica,  sin embargo se va a mantener mamotretos de 40 años en funcionamiento y pregunto yo ¿Por qué? ¿Para que? Si tenemos mejores fuentes de energía, mas eficaces, menos contaminantes, ¿Por que preferimos seguir teniendo las antiguallas en funcionamiento en lugar de construir nuevas centrales?, con nueva tecnología, centrales mas seguras y mas eficaces, a lo que quiero llegar es que si son necesarias son necesarias y se deberían construir nuevas y si no se necesitan y si son peligrosas se clausuran y se acabo, pero como estamos gobernados por medias tintas estas contradicciones son las que nos encontramos.

Por otra parte habría que analizar la seguridad física de las centrales nucleares, esto lo pone en evidencia la noticia de ayer (15/02/2011) en la que activistas de Greenpeace pusieron de manifiesto lo vulnerables que son las centrales, 20 activistas burlaron la irrisoria seguridad de la central nuclear y algunos de ellos subieron a la torre de refrigeración haciendo una pintada en la que aparece Peligro Nuclear (ver en pagina de Greenpeace), ¿Que hubiera pasado si en lugar de un grupo de personas que actúan pensando en el bien común  hubiera sido un grupo de terroristas islámicos cargados de explosivos?, las consecuencias hubieran sido nefastas.

Esta preocupación tambien aparece mencionada en uno de los famosos cables de  wikileaks:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000192 

SIPDIS 

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE (MCKNIGHT, ZERDECKI), NEA/FO 
(CATALANO), ISN/RA (NEPHEW, ALLEN-CLOSE, MONGIELLO), 
ISN/WMD, EUR/ERA (DEAN), 
DEPARTMENT PASS TO NSC (RYU, MAGSAMEN, HOLGATE, CONNERY, 
SAMORE, BRADLEY) 
DEPARTMENT PASS TO DOE (GOREVICH) 
FOR USUNVIE/IAEA 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020 

TAGS: PARM, PREL, SP, KNNP, MO, KGIC, PTER 

SUBJECT: SPAIN: MFA DISCUSSES COMBATING NUCLEAR TERRORISM 

REF: A. RABAT 47 
B. MADRID 125 
C. 09 MADRID 98 

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Arnold A. Chacon for reasons 1.4 (b) a 
nd (d) 

1. (C) SUMMARY. Carlos Torres, Counselor for Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament within the MFA's DG for 
Strategic Affairs and Terrorism, on February 10 spoke with 
POLOFF and Deputy ECONCOUNS on a nascent MFA proposal 
regarding a year-long series of trilateral technical 
exercises with the USG and Morocco, the reaction among key 
allies to the USG's reforms to Terms of Reference for the 
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and 
Spain's ongoing efforts to protect its domestic nuclear power 
plants from the terrorist threat. END SUMMARY. 

Proposed US-Spain-Morocco Technical Exercises on Nuclear 
Emergency Management 

2. (C) Spanish wants to secure buy-in from the U.S. 
Department of State on a GOS proposal to conduct trilateral 
technical exercises on nuclear emergency management - to be 
held mainly in Morocco - throughout 2011, following extensive 
planning through 2010. Additional, compatible exercises 
could be held in the U.S. and Spain. He said Spain wants to 
cooperate with Morocco, its southern neighbor, on nuclear 
terrorism exercises to improve regional and global security, 
but cooperation between the two on security issues is a 
sensitive topic bilaterally. Torres highlighted that the 
majority of the 2004 Madrid train bombers were originally 
from Morocco and some officials in the Spanish Ministry of 
Interior (MOI) have expressed reservations about close 
cooperation with the Moroccans. A bilateral exercise - 
without U.S. participation - would be difficult, according to 
Torres. However, Spain knows that the USG has strong 
relations with Morocco and, with the Department of State's 
presence to coordinate and provide political weight, believes 
that all three nations would likely see the utility in 
conducting trilateral exercises, similar to the table-top 
exercises that Spain hosted for GICNT partners in Spring 
2008. The Spanish MFA would like to involve the IAEA as 
well. Torres, who is known to Post as a reliable, 
straight-shooting interlocutor, told Embassy officials that 
Spain has a 100 million euro budget that it can apply to this 
proposal, which he said has the support of the both Moroccan 
and Spanish MFAs. He said he realizes the Department of 
State will need to evaluate this proposal and said he is 
available to discuss it. 

3. (C) Torres outlined the genesis for this proposal by 
relating that while in Rabat in mid-January observing a 
U.S.-Morocco bilateral nuclear emergency management training 
exercise (Ref A), he was encouraged by the technical 
cooperation he witnessed between the U.S Department of 
Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) 
and its Moroccan counterpart. He said that his DOE/NSSA 
contacts were amenable to working with the Spanish, but the 
Moroccan technical experts, despite having invited him, were 
a bit arms-length. Torres suggested that what was missing 
from the events he attended was representation by the 
Department of State. He said that when he raised the issue 
at a GICNT event in Budapest a week later, his U.S. contacts 
were unaware the exercise in Rabat had taken place. He 
informed Embassy officials that Rabat would host a related 
event on March 22 and suggested it would be good for someone 
from the Department of State to attend. 

Arguing for Continuing a Strong U.S. Role in the GICNT 

4. (C) Fleshing out misgivings originally conveyed to Post in 
Ref B, Torres also stated that the GOS is worried by the 
USG's proposed reforms to the GICNT's Terms of Reference, 
which Spain views as likely to put at risk the USG's 
political leadership of the GICNT. He argued that the 
international community needs the GICNT as a viable political 
forum on this issue and noted that the IAEA cannot play that 
role. Torres also conveyed Spain's concern about the 
proposed voting policy within the GICNT, which he thought 
could lead to the GICNT becoming politicized by certain 
members. He also fretted that the voting policy could cause 
problems with Russia, which he suggested was losing interest 
in the GICNT. Torres said that the Spanish delegation aired 
its concerns with US counterparts during the GICNT's January 
19 event in Budapest and further stated that Australia, 
Japan, the Netherlands, and South Korea share Spain's 
concerns on this matter. He remarked that the general 
feeling among these allies is that following the successful 
launch of a very interesting initiative, it is being 
abandoned. He added that each of these countries believes 
they are "maxed out" and cannot step up with further 
contributions. 

Reviewing Physical Security Measures at Spain's Nuclear 
Plants 

5. (C) On the domestic front, Torres said that the MFA and 
the MOI continue to review the physical security of Spanish 
nuclear facilities. Pointing to a four-inch-thick binder 
dated 1987 which presumably addressed lessons learned, he 
stated that he had recently met officials at the MOI, where 
they had discussed the terrorist group Basque Fatherland and 
Liberty's (ETA's) 1977-1982 armed campaign against the 
nuclear plant then under construction in Lemoniz (see Ref C). 
Torres described ETA's campaign as "fairly successful" and 
noted that terrorists managed to get fairly far into the 
facility. He described the current physical security 
measures at Spanish nuclear facilities as "good" but 
suggested they all face one weakness: as currently 
configured, they do not protect against an insider with 
clearances who might want to stage an attack inside one of 
Spain's nuclear facilities. The GOS is increasingly 
concerned about how to defend against this scenario, although 
Torres gave no indication that Spain has concrete information 
that either ETA or radical Islamists are planning an attack 
using such tactics is being planned. 
CHACON